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I. INTRODUCTION
Noncompete agreements, also known as "restrictive cove-
nants" or "covenants not to compete," are contracts in which one
party agrees to avoid undertaking certain employment or em-
ployment-related activities that would be competitive to the other
party.' Although the enforceability of noncompete agreements
depends on the facts of each case, Minnesota courts generally
uphold noncompete agreements if the restrictions against com-
petition are "reasonable.
In recent years, the use of noncompete agreements has dra-
matically increased in the employment setting.3 As long-term
employment relationships have dwindled and loyalty between
employers and employees has declined, many employers have
found noncompete agreements desirable to prevent unfair com-
petition by former employees.4 The increased use of noncompete
agreements, coupled with the willingness of employees to risk
breaching such agreements in order to work in their chosen
fields, has resulted in increased litigation concerning such
agreements.
Employers may seek to use noncompete agreements and
similar devices for a variety of purposes, such as:
9 noncompetition provisions - prohibiting em-
1. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA
L. Rrv. 1049, 1050 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892,
898 (1965) (holding that covenants are valid when the restraint is: 1) for ajust and
honest purpose; 2) for the protection of a legitimate interest of the party in whose
favor it is imposed; 3) reasonable; and 4) not injurious to the public).
3. See Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The
Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete - A Proposal for Re-
form, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531, 532 (1984). Although this Article cites cases that ad-
dress the enforceability of noncompete agreements in connection with the sales of
businesses, it focuses only on noncompete agreements in the employment context.
Courts recognize a distinction between restrictive covenants relating to commer-
cial transactions involving business or property transfers and those relating to em-
ployment contracts entered into by wage earners, and courts use different stan-
dards of reasonableness with respect to each type. See Bennett, 270 Minn. at 534,
134 N.W.2d at 899.
4. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV.
625, 627 (1960) (noting that lawyers and business people surveyed perceived an
increase in the use of noncompete agreements); Note, The Antitrust Implications of
Employee Noncompete Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 MINN. L. REv. 519, 519
n.1 (1982).
5. See Note, supra note 4, at 519 n.1.
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ployees from entering into direct or indirect com-
petition with the employer;
* nonsolicitation provisions - prohibiting former
employees from soliciting the employer's prospects
and customers;
confidential information provisions - prohibiting
former employees from using or disclosing the
employer's confidential or proprietary informa-
tion;
* anti-raiding provisions - prohibiting former em-
ployees from hiring away the employer's other em-
ployees;9 or
* shop rights provisions - giving the employer own-
ership rights to any inventions created during the
employment relationship.0
Despite these advantages, noncompete agreements are not ap-
propriate for every employer. The need for such agreements
depends on the nature of the employer's business, the employ-
er's personnel, and the potential consequences of competition.
Prior to using noncompete agreements, an employer should de-
termine what interests need protection, which employees should
be required to sign noncompete agreements, and whether the
employer would be willing to seek enforcement of such an
6. See, e.g., Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 457
(Minn. 1980) (invalidating a noncompete agreement that prohibited the em-
ployee from directly or indirectly competing with the construction firm for two
years after the termination within a 100-mile radius in a same or similar construc-
tion business and from working as a real estate broker within a 20-mile radius).
7. See, e.g., Webb Publ'g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that the employer's intent was legitimate, but remanding to
determine the reasonableness of the restriction where a noncompete agreement
prohibited a former employee, for 18 months, from soliciting or having an interest
in a business that solicited any customer who had done business with the employer
during the year prior to the termination of employment).
8. See, e.g., Satellite Indus., Inc. v. Keeling, 396 N.W.2d 635, 637-38 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the employment agreement barred the employee
from disclosing any of the employer's inventions, improvements, or discoveries).
9. See, e.g., Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 145 (N.J.
1982) (holding that part of a law firm's departure agreement violated public policy
where termination compensation was withheld from former members who solicit-
ed the law firm's employees).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 181.78 (1996) (governing employers' ownership rights
to inventions).
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agreement in the event of a breach.
For employees, signing a noncompete agreement is often a
prerequisite to obtaining ajob. Accordingly, employees generally
have little bargaining power with regard to noncompete agree-
ments. If at all possible, an employee should avoid signing a non-
compete agreement, because signing the noncompete agreement
may restrict the employee's future ability to earn a livelihood. If
signing a noncompete agreement is a prerequisite to employ-
ment, the employee should be fully aware of the terms and effect
of the agreement. In addition, an employee may be able to nego-
tiate at least some of the terms of the agreement. Finally, and
most importantly, the employee should be aware of the conse-
quences that may result from breaching a noncompete agree-
ment.
This Article discusses the factors Minnesota courts use in de-
termining the enforceability of a noncompete agreement - i.e.,
ascertaining whether the agreement is supported by consider-
ation, if the agreement is reasonable, and what courts may do if a
provision is found to be unreasonable. In addition, this Article
discusses other litigation issues of which employers should be
aware prior to drafting a noncompete agreement and once an
agreement is breached.
II. DETERMINING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT
Generally, the enforceability of noncompete agreements is a
matter of state law;12 however, the Federal Arbitration Act may al-
low the parties to a noncompete agreement to avoid the applica-
tion of state law by providing for arbitration of any alleged
breaches and by specifying the substantive rules that shall apply to
the arbitration. Parties to noncompete agreements also should
be aware of the potential impact of antitrust laws on noncompete
agreements.
14
12. Cf Note, supra note 4, at 519 (proposing that federal antitrust law be ap-
plied to noncompete agreements, instead of state contract law, because antitrust
law allows a more complete assessment).
13. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994). Although arbitration may appear to favor
them, employers must recognize that enforcing arbitration decisions regarding
noncompete clauses can be difficult.
14. Both state and federal antitrust laws declare any contract in restraint of
trade illegal. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract, combination in the form of
[Vol. 23
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The various states, either by statute or by development of the
common law, have adopted different approaches to the enforce-
ability of noncompete agreements. Some states prohibit non-
compete agreements as a matter of public policy while othersP gr P 16 P 
apply varying standards of enforceability. In Minnesota, no stat-
ute addresses the validity of noncompete agreements. Instead,
Minnesota's courts determine the validity of noncompete agree-
ments on a case-by-case basis, applying common-law pnnciples.
A. The Consideration Requirement
As with any contract, a noncompete agreement must be sup-
ported by consideration. Defined broadly, consideration is a
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared illegal."); MINN. STAT. § 325D.51
(1996) ("A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons in
unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful."). The mere fact that
parties agree to eliminate competition between themselves may not be enough to
bring the agreement within the condemnation of antitrust laws. See Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933). For example, the enforce-
ability of a noncompete agreement is determined under the "rule of reason"
analysis of antitrust law, which essentially upholds a restraint of trade that is not
unreasonable. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
689 (1978). Thus, if a noncompete agreement satisfies the common-law reason-
ableness standard, it will likely be upheld under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Lektro-
Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 E2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that unless
the challenged activity conforms to one of the few categories of restraints ad-
judged to be per se illegal, its legality under the Sherman Act is properly tested
under the rule of reason analysis).
15. See Frank B. Harty, Competition Between Employer and Employee: Drafting and
Enforcing Restrictive Covenants in Employment Agreements, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 261, 274-
75 (1985-86). California, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma bar the use of
noncompetition agreements. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1992).
16. See Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974) (granting
an injunction prohibiting the employee from competing with the employer for the
period of time found to be reasonable); Slade Gorton & Co. v. O'Neil, 242 N.E.2d
551, 554-55 (Mass. 1968) (upholding a restrictive covenant for the period of time
during which the employee's employment by a competitor would have substantial
effects on the interests of the former employer); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v.
Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1980).
17. Cf MINN. STAT. § 181.78 (1996) (governing ownership rights to inven-
tions).
18. See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 535-36, 134 N.W.2d 892,
899-900 (1965).
19. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 130. The consideration requirement also ap-
plies to employment contracts that contain provisions prohibiting the misappro-
priation of confidential information. SeeJostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys.,
1997]
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benefit accrued by one party or a detriment suffered by another
party.20 Whether an agreement is supported by consideration de-
pends on the facts of each case,2' and "[i] f consideration is found
at all... inquiry into its adequacy is forbidden.,
2
Consideration exists only if the noncompete agreement is
bargained for and provides the employee with "real advan-





* benefits that are not offered to employees who do
not sign a noncompete agreement; or
* a new promise by the employer to pay the em-
ployee a continuing salary if suitable, non-
competitive employment cannot be found after
27termination of the relationship.
Moreover, to constitute consideration supporting the noncom-
pete agreement, the employer's undertaking must be attribut-
able to the employee's signing of the agreement.
2s
Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 703-04 (Minn. 1982).
20. See, e.g., C & D Invs. v. Beaudoin, 364 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (citing Estrada v. Hanson, 215 Minn. 353, 355, 10 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1943)).
21. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 130.
22. Satellite Indus., Inc. v. Keeling, 396 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn.
1983)).
23. See id.
24. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131; Satellite Indus., 396 N.W.2d at 639.
25. See Satellite Indus., 396 N.W.2d at 639; cf. National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cash-
man, 323 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (finding no consideration existed where
the employees received training, because the training was part of an oral employ-
ment agreement and did not provide the employees with a "real advantage").
26. Compare Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131 (finding the employee derived a bene-
fit after signing the noncompete agreement, since he could not have advanced to
a sales position with the agency had he not signed the agreement), with Freeman v.
Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983) (holding that consider-
ation was insufficient where an employee-shareholder indirectly benefited by a
benefit that accrued to all shareholders of the corporation, regardless of whether
they had signed the agreement), andJostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc.,
318 N.W.2d 691, 703-04 (Minn. 1982) (signing the noncompete agreements did
not provide employees with future benefits, raises, or promotions).
27. See Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1267-68 (8th Cir.
1978) (holding a restrictive covenant was supported by independent considera-
tion, because the employer was obligated to pay the employee his base salary for
two years if he could not find suitable work in another field).
28. See Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (stating that a noncompete agreement that is not ancillary to the employ-
[Vol. 23
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In Minnesota, when an employee signs a noncompete
agreement prior to starting employment, the newjob itself usually
constitutes sufficient consideration to support the agreement.
Consideration may not exist, however, if an employer presents a
noncompete agreement after the employee has commenced em-
ployment.3s Likewise, mere continued employment alone does
not provide the consideration necessary to support a noncompete
agreement. 31 Courts have recognized that an employer attempt-
ing to impose a noncompete agreement after the employee has
accepted a job "takes undue advantage of the inequality of the
parties."" For this reason, consideration does not exist where an
employer presents an employee with a noncompete agreement
after the employee has accepted an offer of employment, and the
employee does not receive a substantial benefit from continued
employment.
33
For instance, in National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court found no consideration where the em-
ployer presented a noncompete agreement to certain employees
during the first several days of work, but not until after the com-
pletion of negotiations regarding compensation, duties, and
benefits.3 4 Similarly, in Sanborn Manufacturing Co. v. Currie, the
court of appeals held that a noncompete agreement executed the
day before commencement of employment, but several weeks after
the employee had accepted the employment offer, "must fail for
lack of consideration. 05 In Currie, the court expressly rejected the
employer's argument that consideration exists so long as the par-
ment contract must be supported by independent consideration).
29. See Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Bredeson, 437 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989); cf Cashman, 323 N.W.2d at 740 (noting that where a covenant is
not ancillary to the initial oral employment contract, it must be supported by in-
dependent consideration).
30. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 130-31 (stating that a reasonable balance be-
tween the interests of the employer and the employee must be maintained).
31. See Freeman, 334 .N.W.2d at 630; cf. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d at 740 (holding
that a noncompete agreement signed after an oral employment agreement and
after the employee has begun work can be sustained if supported by independent
consideration); Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131 (finding monetary and professional ad-
vancement to be adequate consideration for a noncompete agreement signed by
an employee four months after he began work).
32. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d at 741.
33. See Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630; Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys.,
Inc., 318 N. W.2d 691, 703-04 (Minn. 1982).
34. 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982).
35. 500 N.W.2d 161,164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
1997]
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ties executed the noncompete agreement before the employee
began work.36 Thus, lack of consideration may be an employee's
primary defense to an action for breach of a noncompete agree-
ment - particularly when an employer seeks to enforce a non-
compete agreement that was signed after the parties had agreed
upon the other terms and conditions of the employment relation-
ship.7
To avoid consideration problems, an employer requiring
noncompete agreements for prospective employees should notify
applicants that signing such an agreement is a prerequisite to
employment and should obtain a signed agreement when the ap-
plicant accepts an offer of employment.3  An employer imple-
menting noncompete agreements for existing employees, how-
ever, must provide consideration that is a "real advantage" to the
employees.
B. The Reasonableness Requirement
In Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., the Minnesota Supreme
Court noted the inherently competing principles in noncompete
agreements. On the one hand, employers have the right to be se-
cure in their contracts and to pursue their business or employ-
ment free from the interference of others - except where others
act in pursuance of a superior or equal right.40 On the other
hand, the court recognized that noncompete agreements consti-
36. Id. But see Millard v. Electronic Cable Specialists, 790 E Supp. 857, 862
(D. Minn. 1992) (finding consideration where the employee received valuable
training, gained economic and professional benefits, and upon signing the non-
compete agreement, reviewed it paragraph by paragraph, writing "OK" next to
each paragraph - even though the agreement was not signed until after the em-
ployee began work).
37. See, e.g., Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630 (holding that a noncompete agree-
ment signed by a physician subsequent to his original contract was not bargained
for and, therefore, was unenforceable for lack of consideration).
38. See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 132-33 (Minn.
1980) (holding a restrictive covenant unenforceable for failure of consideration
when, prior to employment, the employee was informed he would be required to
sign a noncompete agreement, but he neither signed it nor was shown a copy of it
until eleven days after employment began).
39. See Cashman, 323 N.W.2d at 741 (rejecting a noncompete agreement on
the ground that "[t]here was no advantage which inured to [the employee's]
benefit"); supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
40. Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 532, 134 N.W.2d 892, 897
(1965) (citing Roraback v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators' Union, 140 Minn.
481, 486-87, 168 N.W. 766, 768 (1918)).
[Vol. 23
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tute a partial restraint of trade and, thus, should be "looked upon
with disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully scrutinized.
41
To balance these competing interests, the court adopted a rea-
sonableness standard:
The test applied is whether or not the restraint is neces-
sary for the protection of the business or good will of
the employer, and if so, whether the stipulation has im-
posed upon the employee any greater restraint than is
reasonably necessary to protect the employer's business,
regard being had to the nature and character of the
employment, the time for which the restriction is im-
posed, and the territorial extent of the locality to which
the prohibition extends.42
This "reasonableness" test is still applied today.4
To date, Minnesota cases have not expressly determined
which party bears the burden of proving the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a noncompete agreement. 44 It would appear,
however, that the party seeking to enforce the agreement must
prove its reasonableness, because under general contract law
principles, the party seeking to enforce an agreement must prove
the existence of a valid agreement.45 Since the employer usually is
the party seeking to enforce a noncompete agreement, the em-
ployer will nearly always bear the burden of proving that a valid,
and thus reasonable, agreement exists. Establishing such proof
requires the evaluation of each of the factors set forth in Bennett
(1) the nature and character of the employment relationship; (2)
41. Id. at 533, 134 N.W.2d at 898 (citing Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Wit-
ter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1952)).
42. Id. at 534, 134 N.W.2d at 899.
43. See, e.g., Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (citing Bennett recognizing that a restrictive covenant will be upheld if the
restriction is necessary for the protection of the employer's business or good will
and if its scope is reasonable). Some recent decisions have expressed a willingness
to uphold noncompete agreements "routinely," so long as they are reasonable.
See, e.g., Millard v. Electronic Cable Specialists, 790 F. Supp. 857, 860 (D. Minn.
1992) (holding that a noncompete agreement was "reasonable" because it fur-
thered the legitimate interests of both the employee and the employer, was sup-
ported by ample consideration, and was limited in time and geographic region).
44. See Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 799; cf. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,
660 E2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining that in federal suits brought under
the Sherman Act, the plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving the restraint is un-
reasonable unless the challenged activity violates the Act per se).
45. See, e.g., Gryc v. Lewis, 410 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff has the burden of proving all essential contractual elements).
1997]
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the time for which the restriction is imposed; and (3) the geo-
graphical area to which the prohibition extends.4 In analyzing
these factors, great weight is given to the intent of the parties, and
noncompete agreements should not be extended beyond the par-
ties' true intent.
1. Nature and Character of the Employment Relationship
In order to enforce a noncompete agreement, an employer
must have legitimate business interests to protect.48 The nature
and character of the employment relationship determines
whether the employer is acting pursuant to a legitimate business
interest. In analyzing the employment relationship, the court
may utilize a wide variety of factors, including:
* the employee's experience and the expertise con-
tributed by the employer;
49
* the amount of contact between the employee and
the customers;50
* the existence of direct competition between the
employee and the former employer;
5'
* whether the agreement is broader than necessary
46. Bennett, 270 Minn. at 534, 134 N.W.2d at 899 (1965). In undertaking an
analysis of what is "reasonable," courts also will consider equitable concerns. See
Hruska v. Chandler Assocs., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. 1985).
47. See Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Sheehy Properties, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 882,
885 (Minn. 1978) ("In sum, while covenants against competition should be con-
strued so as to give effect to the intention of the parties, such covenants should not
be extended beyond their true intent.").
48. See Bennett, 270 Minn. at 533, 134 N.W.2d at 898.
49. See Klick v. Crosstown State Bank, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (refusing to enforce a noncompete agreement against an employee of eight
months who had little expertise, while distinguishing another case where the em-
ployee had been employed for ten years and had gained substantial experience).
50. Compare Klick, 372 N.W.2d at 88 (refusing to enforce a noncompete
agreement because the former employee "did not develop any special relation-
ships with bank customers"), with Webb Publ'g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445,
450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing a noncompete agreement where the former
employee's relationship with customers was sufficiently close as to give the em-
ployer a legitimate interest in prohibiting the solicitation of those customers).
51. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131-32 (recognizing an insurance agency's need
to bar former employees from actively soliciting business from its customers). In
Davies, the noncompete agreement prohibited the insurance agency's former em-
ployee from engaging in the insurance business for five years within a 50-mile ra-
dius of Minneapolis, Saint Paul, or Duluth, Minnesota. Id. The court found this
agreement to be too broad and subject to judicial modification. Id.
[Vol. 23
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to protect the employer's business interests, good
will, and trade secrets;"'
whether the information or knowledge sought to
be protected was already known to the employee
or was readily ascertainable by other proper53
means;
* whether the contract attempts to restrict competi-
tion beyond those functions actually performed by
the employee; 54 and
* whether the employer has enforced noncompete
agreements against other employees, since a fail-
ure to do so may evidence the lack of a legitimate
business interest in enforcing the covenant.
In contrast, courts disfavor noncompete agreements used by
an employer simply to discourage employees from seeking new
employment or merely to protect the employer from fair com-
. 56petition. These agreements "constitute a form of industrial
peonage without redeeming virtue in the American enterprise
system. Moreover, an employer must avoid imposing a non-
compete agreement so that the employee cannot obtain any
52. See Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ("[A]
noncompete covenant in an employment contract will be enforced when neces-
sary to protect the goodwill of the employer's business.").
53. See Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn.
1980) (finding that the former employee could not reasonably be restrained from
acting as a real estate broker, because the information the employer sought to pro-
tect was available to the public); Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn.
13, 18-19, 160 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1968) (denying an employer's request for injunc-
tive relief; reasoning that information seen by employees is not a "trade secret"
merely because it is labeled "confidential").
54. See West, 281 Minn. at 19, 160 N.W.2d at 570. In West, the court refused to
enforce a restriction against a former employee where the employer unreasonably
extracted a commitment far broader than the employee's actual functions and
status could reasonably require. Id. Although classified as a technical representa-
tive, the employee was actually an ordinary salesman. Id.
55. Cf West, 281 Minn. at 20, 160 N.W.2d at 571. Attempting to enforce a
noncompete agreement against one employee, but not others may indicate that
the employer's purpose was to punish the employee, and thus, was improper. See
id. But see Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 ER.D. 324, 336 (D. Minn.
1980) (holding that evidence that an employer did not enforce noncompete
agreements against other employees was not "overly probative" of the employer's
intent to relinquish its contractual rights and, thus, did not provide the employee
with a waiver defense).
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suitable employment.
Despite the strict judicial approach to noncompete agree-
ments, some well-crafted agreements survive scrutiny. In some
employment fields, such as the legal field, noncompete agree-
ments may be unenforceable as a matter of public policy.59
2. Temporal Scope
The reasonableness of a noncompete agreement also de-
pends on the agreement's duration.6 0 In determining whether a
temporal restriction is reasonable, courts have adopted two alter-
native standards. A temporal restriction may be reasonable if it is
for (1) "the length of time necessary to obliterate the identi-
fication between the employer and the employee in the minds of
the employer's customers," or (2) "the length of time necessary
for the employee's replacement to obtain licenses and learn the
fundamentals of the business."
61
While a vast number of Minnesota cases have addressed what
constitutes a reasonable temporal restriction,62 the factual nature
of this inquiry has not yielded a bright-line rule for determining
reasonableness. For instance, some cases have upheld three-year
temporal restrictions, while others have rejected them.63
58. See Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, 411, 180 N.W. 553, 555 (1920)
(refusing to enforce a noncompete agreement that was designed to "needlessly
fetter the employee, and prevent him from seeking to better his condition").
59. See MINN. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6 (1985) (prohibiting
an agreement that restricts a lawyer's right to practice after termination of the
employment relationship); Kenneth S. Engel, Note, Should Minnesota Abandon the
Per Se Rule Against Law Firm Noncompetition Agreements?, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
133 (1997).
60. See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899
(1965).
61. Dean Van Horn Consulting Assocs. v. Wold (Dean Van Horn I), 395
N.W.2d 405, 408-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); accord Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v.
Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131-32 (Minn. 1980).
62. See, e.g., Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131-32 (approving one year); Webb Publ'g
Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (approving eighteen
months); cf. Bennett, 270 Minn. at 535, 134 N.W.2d at 898-99 (holding that the rea-
sonableness of an eighteen-month restriction presented a fact question precluding
summary judgment).
63. Compare B & Y Metal Painting Inc. v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn.
1979) (finding a three-year restriction reasonable where the covenant not to com-
pete arose out of both a sale of business and an employment contract with the
purchaser, the seller's attorney drafted both the covenant not to compete and the
employment contract, and the seller signed the covenant as part of the sale), with
Dean Van Horn II, 395 N.W.2d at 409 (finding a three-year restriction unreasonable
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This division of authority places employers in a difficult posi-
tion. On the one hand, an employer cannot impose an unrea-
sonable temporal restriction, because a court simply may refuse to
enforce the agreement in its entirety.64 On the other hand, an
employer's business interests may not be protected adequately by
a shorter temporal restriction. An employer's practical solution
to this dilemma may be to impose a maximum restriction of two
years, with an automatic extension of the agreement for a period
of time equal to any breach of the agreement.
3. Geographic Scope
From an employee's perspective, the geographic scope of an
agreement may be the most important factor in finding an
agreement unreasonable. The validity of a geographic limitation
generally depends on the nature of the employer's business, the
area in which the employee actually worked, and whether the re-
strictions would cause the employee undue hardship.65 Courts
may also consider whether the restrictions are broader than nec-
essary to protect the employer's good will and whether the restric-
tion has a deleterious effect on the public interest.66 As with many
aspects of noncompete agreements, what may be reasonable in
one case may be unreasonable in another. Although much un-
certainty results from the factual nature of each decision, an em-
ployer's best course is to limit noncompete agreements to those
geographic areas in which the employee actually worked for the
employer.6
In two circumstances, the absence of a geographic limitation
may not be fatal to a noncompete agreement. First, a geographic
limitation may not be necessary if the employer has a nationwide
because the employer alerted clients to the termination of its relationship with the
former employee), and Klick v. Crosstown State Bank, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding a three-year restriction unreasonable where the
former employee never developed any special relationships with customers).
64. See, e.g., Klick, 372 N.W.2d at 88-89.
65. SeeAlside, Inc. v. Larson, 300 Minn. 285, 296, 220 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1974).
66. Cf, e.g., Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1977).
67. See Klick, 372 N.W.2d at 88.
68. Compare Alside, 300 Minn. at 296, 220 N.W.2d at 280 (upholding a cove-
nant within the six-county area in which the employee actively worked), with
Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 19, 160 N.W.2d 566, 571
(1968) (rejecting a 50-mile radius restriction where the salesperson's ordinary ter-
ritory did not include the entire area).
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or worldwide clientele and business. If the employer's business
does not span the nation, however, a court may refuse to enforce
the agreement or, at least, the nationwide geographic limitation.70
Second, a customer-based restriction may be valid in lieu of a
geographic restriction.71 A noncompete agreement that contains
no geographic limitation may be deemed reasonable, if it bars the
solicitation of those customers with whom the former employee
actually worked or those customers with whom the former em-
ployee had contact during employment. A customer-based re-
striction, however, may be rejected if it bars the employee from
working with all existing or potential customers of the former
employer.7 3 For instance, in Webb Publishing Co. v. Fosshage, the
court indicated that a noncompete agreement prohibiting solici-
tation of all customers of the former employer suggests over-
breadth, and it might be more appropriate to narrow the scope of
the restriction to those customers with whom the employee had
dealt personally.
4
C. Modifying the Agreement to Make it Reasonable
Rather than rendering an entire agreement invalid, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has held that a court may modify unrea-
sonable provisions of a noncompete agreement so as to make it
69. See Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
("[W]e hold that a restrictive covenant on employment lacking a territorial limita-
tion is not per se unenforceable.").
70. See Ring Computer Sys., Inc. v. Paradata Computer Networks, Inc., No. C4-
90-889, 1990 WL 132615, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 1990) (refusing to en-
force a noncompete agreement that lacked a geographical limitation, because
Minnesota courts require a reasonable noncompete covenant to have both time
and geographical restrictions).
71. See Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 132 (Minn.
1980); Webb Publ'g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
72. See, e.g., Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Bredeson, 437 N.W.2d 698, 703
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (finding a restrictive covenant reasonable where it prohib-
ited the employee from soliciting any business for two years from customers he
personally served while with the company).
73. See Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d at 450.
74. Id. While remanding the issue for consideration of the appropriate scope
of the restraint, the court noted that the restriction might be overbroad in light of
its purpose. Id. Although the employer's clients were assigned to individual ac-
count executives, the noncompete agreement restricted Fosshage from soliciting
business from any of Webb's customers. Id. at 447, 450, Because the record did
not indicate that Fosshage had access to information on other Webb customers
that would aid him in soliciting their business, the court suggested that a restric-
tion as to all customers could be deemed unreasonable. Id. at 447.
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reasonable.75 Although this judicial power is often referred to as
the "blue pencil" doctrine, Minnesota courts utilize a more ex-
pansive approach. Whereas the "blue pencil" doctrine tradition-
ally allows a court only to strike language from an agreement,
76
Minnesota has modified the doctrine by allowing courts to strike,
change, or insert language as necessary to make the agreement
reasonable.77
Where a court blue-pencils a noncompete agreement, the
court must provide an explanation of why the revision is war-
78ranted. Courts are not required to modify an overly broad non-
compete agreement, however, and may refuse to enforce the
agreement entirely.79 Thus, an employer should not draft the
broadest possible noncompete agreement with the hope or ex-
pectation that a court simply will modify and enforce it to the ex-
tent that it is reasonable.
Under this modified version of the blue pencil doctrine, a
court actually may extend the restrictions contained in a non-
compete agreement or prevent an employee from competing
even when the agreement has lapsed.80 For instance, to provide
meaningful relief from violations of trade secrets laws, the su-
preme court in Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc.,
prohibited the employee from contacting certain key customers
even though the contractual noncompetition period had
elapsed.8'
75. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131-32 (adopting the "blue pencil" doctrine in
the employment context); cf. Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Minn.
1977) (adopting the "blue pencil" doctrine in the context of a sale of a business).
In Bess, the court affirmed the district court's modification to a restrictive covenant
that lacked necessary territorial or temporal limitations by restricting the agree-
ment to the area in and around the town of the seller's former business. Bess, 257
N.W.2d at 794-95. The court chose a five-year restrictive period, because it repre-
sented a reasonable balance between the protection of the plaintiff's good will and
avoidance of undue hardship to the defendant. Id. at 795.
76. See Bess, 257 N.W.2d at 794 (noting that in a majority of jurisdictions, the
"blue pencil" doctrine requires that the reasonable and unreasonable restraints be
severable - i.e., unreasonable restraints will be stricken from the agreement, not
modified).
77. See Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131 n.1; cf Bess, 257 N.W.2d at 794-95.
78. See Satellite Indus., Inc. v. Keeling, 396 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
79. See Klick v. Crosstown State Bank, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
80. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 93
(Minn. 1979).
81. Id. at 94.
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III. LITIGATION ISSUES
As with determining the reasonableness of noncompete
agreements, litigation involving noncompete agreements is
fraught with uncertainty. Prior to engaging in litigation involving
a noncompete agreement, both the employer and employee must
carefully consider many factors. First and foremost, both parties
must balance the likely benefits of litigation against the risks and
significant expenses that accumulate from the probable motions
for injunctive relief, fast-track depositions, and other discovery.
The parties also must consider the following litigation pitfalls.
A. Choice of Law and Forum Considerations
Because different states treat noncompete agreements in
vastly different manners, the determination of which state's law
should apply is crucial.82 To protect the enforceability of a non-
compete agreement, an employer should carefully consider the
laws of any states that have a reasonable relation to the contract-
ing parties and should include an appropriate choice of law pro-
vision in the agreement.
If such a choice of law provision is included in the agree-
ment, Minnesota courts likely will honor a reasonable provision.83
Other states, however, have ignored choice of law provisions and
have refused to enforce noncompete agreements where the
agreements were deemed contrary to the public policy of the fo-
814rum state. Those decisions may thwart any attempt to enforce a
82. When a choice of law conflict arises, a court must decide what state law it
will apply among potentially applicable legal rules. James A. White, Comment,
Stacking the Deck: Wisconsin's Application of Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations to
Torts Choice-of-Law Cases, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 401, 401. Choice of law conflicts occur
when more than one jurisdiction has significant contacts with the parties and/or
the incident involved in the case. See id.
83. See Milliken & Co. v. Eagle Packaging Co., 295 N.W.2d 377, 380 n.1 (Minn.
1980). Likewise, Minnesota courts will honor the parties' forum selection provi-
sion, unless the provision is unreasonable. See Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v.
Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 889-91 (Minn. 1982).
84. See, e.g., Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 97 Cal.
Rptr. 811, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (finding parties' choice of law agreement for
application of New York law invalid where it would offend public policy under
California's Business and Professions Code § 16600, which declares "every contract
by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or busi-
ness of any kind is to that extent void"); Davis v. Ebsco Indus., Inc., 150 So. 2d 460,
464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (finding a covenant not to compete in magazine
subscription and recreational businesses, although valid under New York law, con-
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noncompete agreement in those states. Thus, a forum selection
clause is also very important.
In the absence of a choice of law provision, Minnesota courts
85
follow the "better law" approach . Under the "better law" rule,
when Minnesota has significant contacts with either party, the in-
cident occurs in another state, and there is a conflict of law, Min-
nesota will apply the "better law" to further governmental inter-
e~S86ests.
8
Other states follow different choice of law rules. For exam-
ple, the "lex loci" doctrine, the traditional tort conflict-of-law rule,
dictates that the law of the state where the incident occurs gov-
erns.8 7 The "most significant contacts" test looks to the law of the
jurisdiction that has the most significant contacts with the parties
and the conflict. 8 If the agreement does not contain a choice of
law provision, the forum state frequently applies its own law.
Thus, the failure to include a choice of law provision or a forum
selection clause in a noncompete agreement may give rise to "fo-
rum-shopping" by the employer or the employee.
B. Other Claims for Employers
In addition to alleging a violation of a noncompete agree-
ment, an employer should consider whether to assert one or
more additional claims. These claims may provide employers
with protection even in the absence of an enforceable noncom-
pete agreement.
trary to Florida public policy when extending beyond five years).
85. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 164, 203 N.W.2d 408, 413 (1973).
The policy behind the "better law" approach is that "[u] nless other considerations
demand it, we should not go out of our way to enforce [the] law of another state
as against the better law of our own state." See id. (quoting Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d
205, 210 (N.H. 1966)). Further, "[t]he fact that... Minnesota has the better law
reinforces our decision. The legislature of this state has shown its antipathy to-
ward the guest statute by refusing to enact one." Id. (quoting Bolgrean v. Stich,
293 Minn. 8, 10, 196 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1972)).
86. See id. at 164, 203 N.W.2d at 413-18; Comment, Conflict of Laws: Minnesota
Rejects the "Significant Contacts" Doctrine in Favor of the "Better Law" Test, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 199, 206 (1974).
87. See Comment, supra note 86, at 199.
88. See id. at 200.
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1. The Law of Trade Secrets
An employer should first consider whether the employee has
violated applicable trade secrets laws.89 Minnesota has adopted
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which statutorily defines
trade secrets and provides for injunctive relief in the event of a
violation. 90 If the employee has used or disclosed information
that is within the statutory definition of a trade secret, the em-
ployer should allege a violation of the UTSA.91
2. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
Employers also should consider whether the employee or any
third parties may be liable for tortious interference with contrac-
tual relations. Although persons who were not parties to a con-
tract generally cannot be sued for breach of the contract, a third
party who encourages an employee to breach a noncompete
agreement may be held liable under tort-based theories.92 The
most common theory is a tortious interference claim against the
employee's subsequent employer.93 Employers seeking to avoid
89. Employers can use noncompete agreements to protect information that
would not be otherwise protected by the law of trade secrets. See Saliterman v.
Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 177-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). However, courts will not
enforce noncompete agreements that attempt to protect information that is gen-
erally known or easily obtained. See, e.g.,Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn. 1980).
90. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1996). The UTSA defines "trade
secret" as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not be-
ing readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can ob-
tain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its se-
crecy.
Id. § 325C.01, subd. 5.
91. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 E2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating that under the UTSA only reasonable efforts are required to protect the
confidentiality of putative trade secrets, and the employee cannot defend an al-
leged violation by claiming the employer failed to undertake "all conceivable ef-
forts" to protect it).
92. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 96
(1979).
93. See, e.g., id. (holding the subsequent employer liable for punitive damages
after encouraging employees of the former employer to breach noncompete
agreements by coming to work for him in a competing business and by bringing
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potential liability for tortious interference should ask new em-
ployees whether the new employment relationship will violate any
existing noncompete agreements to which they are parties.
3. Nondisclosure and Confidentiality Claims
Even in the absence of a noncompete agreement, an em-
ployee may have a common-law duty of confidentiality with re-
spect to any information the employer deems confidential and
which the employer identifies to the employee as being confiden-
tial in nature.9 4 Rather than relying on this common-law duty,
however, many employers require employees to enter into an
agreement regarding confidential information.
Although confidential information provisions minimally re-
strain trade, Minnesota courts generally evaluate noncompete
provisions and confidentiality provisions pursuant to the same
reasonableness standard.95  Unlike trade secrets laws, which in-
clude a nebulous statutory definition of protected information,9 ' a
confidential information provision can be very broad in its appli-
cation, because the employer has more control over defining
what is a "secret."
C. Additional Defenses for Employees
In mapping a litigation strategy, both the employer and the
employee must consider the employee's affirmative defenses or
counterclaims that could defeat the employer's claim, further
complicate the litigation, or even result in an award for the em-
ployee.
In recent years, courts have become more receptive to the
wrongful termination defense in actions for breach of a noncom-
pete agreement.97 Termination of an employee may preclude en-
with them confidential information that would help him develop his business).
94. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890,
903 (Minn. 1983); Equipment Advertiser, Inc. v. Harris, 271 Minn. 451, 458-59, 136
N.W.2d 302, 306-07 (1965); Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp.,
366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
95. See, e.g., Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 16, 160
N.W.2d 566, 569 (1968) (applying the same reasonableness test to two restrictive
covenants, one providing for confidentiality and the other prohibiting competi-
tion). For a discussion of the test, see supra text accompanying note 42.
96. See supra note 90 (providing Minnesota's statutory definition of "trade se-
cret").
97. See, e.g., Ward v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 443 N.E.2d 1342, 1344
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forcement of a noncompete agreement, at least where the em-
ployer has taken "undue advantage" of its right to terminate the
employee. For instance, where an employee is wrongfully ter-
minated or constructively discharged, an employer may be pre-
cluded from enforcing a noncompete agreement. 9 This wrong-
ful termination defense could arise out of a myriad of claims,
such as discrimination, sexual harassment, whistle-blowing, tor-
tious conduct, or a breach of other contractual provisions.
An employee faced with pending noncompete litigation also
should consider whether the employer's actions constitute tor-
tious interference with contractual relations. For instance, if the
employer's attempt to enforce the noncompete agreement is
without legal support, the employer may be liable for tortious in-
terference with the relationship between the employee and the
subsequent employer.00
D. Relief Available Upon Breach
1. Injunctive Relief
Frequently, an employer will seek injunctive relief immedi-
ately upon the commencement of noncompete litigation. 1 In
considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the court must con-
sider:
(1) the relationship between the parties before the
dispute;
(2) the harm the plaintiff will suffer if relief is denied
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983). The wrongful termination of two insurance salesmen con-
stituted a breach so material as to discharge them from any obligation under their
employment contracts. See id. The salesmen were not barred from recovering
damages for the wrongful termination, despite the fact they had competed with
their former employer following termination. See id.
98. See Hruska v. Chandler Assocs., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. 1985);
Webb Publ'g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Edin v. Jostens, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)); see also Rao v.
Rao, 718 E2d 219, 224 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding a restrictive covenant unen-
forceable when the employee is terminated in bad faith and without good cause).
99. See, e.g., Edin, 343 N.W.2d at 694 (refusing to enforce a covenant where a
discharged sales representative was wrongfully terminated by a manufacturing
company).
100. See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 270 Minn. 525, 527, 134 N.W.2d 892, 895
(1965) (analyzing an action by a radio announcer against the former employer for
tortious interference after the latter threatened a potential employer with legal
action if it hired the announcer).
101. See, e.g., Edin, 343 N.W.2d at 693.
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compared with the harm inflicted on the defen-
dant if the injunction is issued;
(3) the likelihood that one party or the other will pre-
vail on the merits;
(4) the public interest involved, if any; and
(5) the administrative burden involved in enforcing
the relief requested.'2
The second factor - i.e., balancing the hardships - is the most
important.1
0 3
In addition, the party seeking injunctive relief must establish
that its other legal remedies, such as monetary damages, are not
adequate and that the injunction is necessary to prevent irrepara-
ble injury °4 Although irreparable injury may be inferred from
the breach of an otherwise valid noncompete agreement, this in-
ference may be rebutted by evidence that the employee "has no
hold on the good will of the business or its clientele." 0 Irrepara-
ble injury likely will not exist unless the employee's breach of the
noncompete agreement is continuous. 06
Because there is ample precedent, courts may be more will-
ing to impose injunctive relief in noncompete cases than in other107
cases. 7Tis is particularly true in cases where the defendant
employee also is using confidential information or trade secrets.
°8
Seeking injunctive relief, however, is not without risk. For in-
102. See Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co., Inc. v. Bredeson, 437 N.W.2d 698, 701
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 Minn.
264, 274-75, 137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (1965)).
103. SeeEdin, 343 N.W.2d at 694.
104. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 92
(Minn. 1979).
105. Webb Publ'g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
see also Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 16 n.4, 160 N.W.2d
566, 569 n.4 (1968).
106. See Satellite Indus., Inc. v. Keeling, 396 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
107. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Burnett, 160 N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Iowa
1968); Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 209 Minn. 470, 476-77, 297 N.W. 178, 181-82
(1941); Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 213-14 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973); Vermont Elec. Supply Co. v. Andrus, 315 A.2d 456, 459 (Vt. 1974).
108. Compare Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 93 (extending protection of certain key ac-
counts two years beyond the original period of the restriction where the defendant
used confidential information and trade secrets), with Minnesota Best Maid
Cookie Co. v. Flour Pot Cookie Co., 412 N.W.2d 380, 385-86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(refusing to grant injunctive relief where the alleged violation did not involve the
use or disclosure of confidential information).
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stance, in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Loescher, the employer ob-
tained a temporary restraining order after posting an injunction
bond.' °9 After the employee prevailed at trial, the supreme court
allowed the employee to recover damages against the bond."0
2. Monetary Damages
The award of injunctive relief does not preclude an award of
damages."' However, "[d]amages do not flow from the breach of
a covenant not to compete as a matter of course. They must be
proved.""
2
An employer may prove its damages by at least two methods.
First, the employer may show lost profits were directly caused by a
breach of the noncompete agreement and that the amount of the
loss can be calculated with reasonable certainty.' Second, where
an employee wrongfully profits from the breach of an agreement,
the measure of damages may be the employee's actual gain.''
4
The value of the employee's gain may be determined by the em-
ployee's actual profits or by the value of the advantage gained by
the employee in violating the agreement.!
5
Because an employer's actual damages are often difficult to
prove, employers should consider including a liquidated damages
provision in their noncompete agreements. 6 A liquidated dam-
109. 291 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Minn. 1980).
110. Id. The court also held that the employee had no duty to mitigate his
damages by obtaining local employment where doing so would violate the injunc-
tion. Id. at 221. Likewise, the employee was not required to seek or accept em-
ployment outside his line of business or at a great distance. Id. Moreover, the
court held it would be degrading and offensive, as a matter of law, to require an
employee to accept reinstatement with the former employer. Id. at 222.
111. See Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94.
112. B & Y Metal Painting, Inc. v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn. 1979).
113. See id.
114. See Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94-95 (allowing the measure of damages to be
10% of the employee's revenue, which constituted the profits wrongfully gained
from his misappropriation of confidential information from his former employer);
Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 209 Minn. 470, 475, 297 N.W. 178, 181 (1941)
(awarding the employer damages at least equal to the profits the ex-employee
made from invading territory protected by a noncompete agreement).
115. See Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94-95; Peterson, 209 Minn. at 475, 297 N.W. at
181.
116. No reported Minnesota cases have determined whether a liquidated
damages clause in a noncompete agreement precludes the availability of injunc-
tive relief. The general rule, however, is that a liquidated damages provision will
not preclude equitable relief, absent express language in the contract stating that
the liquidated damages were to be the sole remedy in the event of a breach. See,
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ages clause generally will be upheld"' and can be used when
damages include items that are difficult to value, such as good will
or lost profits."8 Indeed, if the actual damages are speculative
and difficult to prove, courts may be willing to uphold a liqui-
dated damages award that is "much larger than the apparent ac-
tual injury and loss."" 9 The reasonableness of a liquidated dam-
ages provision depends on the facts of each case. 20
Although punitive damages usually are not recoverable in a
breach of contract action, they may be recovered where the
breach resulted from an independent or willful tort and the de-
121fendant acted with malice. In Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds
& Associates, Inc., the court upheld an award of $10,000 in puni-
tive damages pursuant to a tortious interference claim. The
court found the defendant acted with malice, because the defen-
dant knew that the noncompete agreements existed, encouraged
two of the plaintiffs employees to breach the agreements by com-
ing to work for the defendant, and then used trade secrets the
employees took from their former employer.
12
1
Finally, attorney fees may not be recovered in an action to en-
force a noncompete agreement absent specific contractual or
statutory authority.124 If a noncompete agreement provides for
the recovery of attorney fees, however, a court may be willing to
e.g., Brian McDonagh S.C. v. Moss, 565 N.E.2d 159, 160-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see
aLso 1 CHARLES L. KNAPP, COMMERCIAL DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN BUSINESS
LITIGATION, § 9A.02[2] (1995) ("A valid liquidated damages clause generally does
not foreclose a plaintiff from suing for specific performance, assuming the pre-
requisites for equitable relief are present.").
117. See Dean Van Horn Consulting Assocs., Inc. v. Wold (Dean Van Horn II),
395 N.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
118. See Dean Van Horn Consulting Assocs., Inc. v. Wold (Dean Van Horn 1),
367 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
119. Id.
120. Compare Roth v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 532 E Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Minn.
1982) (upholding a contract under which the employer could terminate deferred
compensation of $90,000 per year if the employee engaged in direct competition
with employer), with Bellboy Seafood Corp. v. Nathanson, 410 N.W.2d 349, 352-53
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding unenforceable a penalty clause that required an
employee to pay back his share of profits for the last fiscal year if he went into
competition with the employer).
121. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 95
(Minn. 1979) (defining malice as "the intentional doing of a harmful act without
legal justification").
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awar fes totheprevilig .125award fees to the prevailing party. In the absence of a contrac-
tual provision, attorney fees can be recovered where the unsuc-
cessful party disputes in bad faith the existence or meaning of the
agreement. Minnesota's trade secrets laws also provide for the
recovery of attorney fees under certain circumstances.
IV. DRAFTING A NONCOMPETE AGREEMENT
Careful drafting of a noncompete agreement is essential. A
well-drafted noncompete agreement may dissuade employees
from breaching the agreement, and it may simplify subsequent
litigation by eliminating or weakening potential defenses to en-
forcement of the agreement.
Employers should draft noncompete agreements to avoid any
possible ambiguities. Roberts v. Baumgartner provides an example
of an ambiguity that defeated enforcement of a noncompete
agreement. In Roberts, the court distinguished between "termi-• , • • 129
nation" and "expiration" of the agreement. Although the court
acknowledged the similar dictionary meanings of the terms, the
court held that a noncompete agreement applicable only upon
"termination" was not enforceable following "expiration" of the
agreement.
130
In determining the validity of a noncompete agreement,
courts may consider which party drafted the agreement and may
125. See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Ford, No. C4-94-2179, 1995 WL 238837, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1995) (awarding the employer attorney fees pursuant to a
clause in the noncompete agreement providing for the award of such fees to the
employer if it prevailed in an enforcement proceeding).
126. See Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 96-97; see also MINN. STAT. § 549.21 (1996) (al-
lowing reimbursement for certain costs in civil actions).
127. See MINN. STAT. § 325C.04 (1996) (providing that reasonable attorney fees
may be awarded to the prevailing party if (i) a misappropriation claim is made in
bad faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith,
or (iii) willful and malicious misappropriation occurred).
128. 391 N.W.2d 545, 547-48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Roberts, the covenant
prohibited the subcontractor from providing physical or occupational therapy
services to the principal contractor's employer upon "any such termination" of the
subcontracts. Id.
129. See id. at 547-48.
130. Id. The court found that the subcontracts did not use the term "expira-
tion" to distinguish natural termination from termination by action of the parties;
nor did the subcontracts use the word "termination" to refer to expiration of the
subcontracts. Id. at 548. The word "termination" was used only in relation to the
conclusion of the agreement by the action of the parties. See id.
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construe the agreement against the drafting party.' 13 To avoid
such an interpretation, an employer should consider including a
provision expressly stating that the agreement shall not be con-
strued against the drafter.
To deter subsequent breaches of the agreement, the drafter
should include a provision requiring the employee to notify the
employer of any successive employment within the duration of
the noncompete agreement. Absent such notice, an employer
may not know whether a breach has occurred.
To enhance the likelihood of enforcement, the agreement
should contain a recital that the employee has received consider-
ation to support the agreement.3 2 The agreement also should in-
clude an acknowledgment by the employee that the restrictions
contained in the agreement are reasonable and necessary to pro-
tect the employer's interests. Further, the drafter must carefully
define the scope of the agreement's restrictions, including a de-
scription of the conduct prohibited, a reasonable temporal re-
striction, and a reasonable geographic restriction. 33
The employer should consider whether to include a prohibi-
tion against solicitation of the company's employees and a provi-
sion requiring the prompt return of company property upon
termination of the employment relationship. In addition, a con-
tinuing salary Rrovision may convince a court that the agreement
is reasonable.
The agreement also should be drafted so as to eliminate po-
tential litigation problems. First, the agreement should include
a severability clause, which may persuade a court not to reject the
agreement in its entirety if isolated clauses are deemed unreason-
able. 36 Second, the agreement should contain a choice of law
131. See, e.g., B & Y Metal Painting Inc. v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn.
1979) (opening of the seller's new competing business directly violated the con-
tract, where the seller's attorney drafted the three-year covenant not to compete,
the covenant was reasonable, and the seller signed the covenant as part of the sale
of the business).
132. See Fitzgerald v. English, 73 Minn. 266, 269, 76 N.W. 27, 29 (1898) (ex-
plaining that a contractual recital of the adequacy of consideration constitutes re-
buttable evidence of consideration).
133. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 1053-63; supra Part II.B.
134. See supra text accompanying note 27 (describing a continuing salary pro-
vision).
135. See generally supra Part III (discussing litigation issues arising from non-
compete agreements).
136. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
1997]
25
Laurie and Harbeck: Balancing Business Protection with Freedom to Work: A Review of N
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA WREVEW
provision and a forum selection clause.' Third, the agreement
should state that it binds and benefits successors and assigns, re-
mains enforceable after termination of the employment relation-
ship, and remains enforceable regardless of whether the termi-
nation of employment is voluntary or involuntary. Fourth, the
agreement should provide that the employer's failure to enforce
the agreement immediately or its failure to enforce similar
agreements against other employees does not constitute a waiver
or estoppel of the employer's rights.
38
A well-drafted agreement will enable an employer to recover
its damages to the fullest extent of the law. The agreement can
include either a liquidated damages provision or a provision stat-
ing that the employer may recover damages in an amount equal
to the greater of the employer's economic losses or the em-
ployee's economic gains. The agreement should also entitle the
employer to recover all attorney fees, costs, and expenses in a
successful action to enforce the agreement. A provision acknowl-
edging that the employer will suffer irreparable harm from com-
petition, or upon use or disclosure of confidential information or
trade secrets, may make it easier for the employer to obtain in-
junctive relief. Finally, the agreement should include a provision
automatically extending the agreement for a period of time equal
to any breach.
V. CONCLUSION
A noncompete agreement must be supported by consider-
ation and be reasonably necessary to protect the employer's le-
gitimate business interests, while not unduly restricting an em-
ployee's right to earn a living. Given the increased use of these
agreements, litigation related to them has increased. Such litiga-
tion often is fraught with difficulties and frequently is expensive.
Careful drafting of noncompete agreements can reduce the like-
lihood of litigation difficulties but cannot eliminate all potential
problems. Thus, employers and employees should enter into
noncompete agreements and pursue their enforcement only after
careful consideration of the facts and legal issues.
137. See supra Part III.A.
138. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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